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ABSTRACT 
This paper seeks to understand the connection between political attacks on independent 
judiciaries and democracy scores. This study analyzed 2700 observations of democratic countries 
from 1980 to 2015 to test and potentially to identify if political attacks on independent judiciaries 
decrease high court independence thus resulting in a decrease of democracy scores. This paper 
found evidence to support that political attacks on courts do negatively impact democracy scores 
and that there have been more political attacks on courts after 2000 than before 2000.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Modern constitutional democracies are struggling to survive in the face of populism and 
authoritarianism. However, it was not always that way. Research revered constitutional 
democracies and the abilities their institutions had to uphold the rights and liberties of the 
civilians that supported them. One such institution is the independent judiciary or the high court. 
Research suggests that independent judiciaries play a pivotal role in protecting constitutional 
democracies (Gibler and Randazzo 2011). It has been demonstrated that older, more established 
courts in wealthy democracies protect the country from reverting into an authoritarian regime by 
Gibler and Randazzo. Current research provides us with several examples of high courts in 
constitutional democracies ruling to preserve democracies, thus supporting the theory that 
independent judiciaries do help thwart democratic backsliding (Ginsburg 2018). However, recent 
literature contests this by suggesting that the impact of independent judiciaries may not be as 
strong as Gibler and Randazzo originally found. Other court scholars are finding examples of 
high courts’ inabilities to prevent democratic backsliding (Blauberger and Kelemen 2017; 
Kovacs and Scheppele 2018; McCoy et. al 2018). Numerous findings suggest that global 
democracy rates are declining more rapidly than in the previous century (Chafetz and Pozen 
2018; Huq and Ginsburg 2018; McCoy et. al 2018). Not only is democracy experiencing a 
downward shift, but the type of democratic backsliding has evolved as well. No longer is the 
global community witnessing aggressive military coups and obvious election tampering to 
overthrow a democracy like it did during the Cold War. Instead, there has been a rise in the 
degradation of political norms like attacking democratic institutions (Bermeo 2016; Huq and 
Ginsburg 2018). Throughout this paper, I will be expanding on the findings of Gibler and 
Randazzo by demonstrating what has changed since their study has concluded and how these 
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changes might be affecting the relationship between courts and democracies now. One disparity I 
am attempting to address the effectiveness of courts in preventing democratic backsliding after 
the Cold War in the face of political attacks. It is to my belief that political attacks on the courts 
make them less effective in preventing democratic backsliding. 
1.1 Theoretical Foundation 
1.1.1 Democratic Backsliding 
For the sake of this paper, I will be defining democratic backsliding as the systematic 
breakdown of democratic norms, structures, and institutions in order to consolidate power to one 
branch, regime, political group, or person in a government. In their article on how independent 
judiciaries protect countries from democratic backsliding, Gibler and Randazzo tested their 
sample from 1960 to 2000 meaning that a majority of the democratic backsliding during this 
time took place during the Cold War. The ways in which democracies decay have changed from 
the Cold War to the present day. During the Cold War, the usurpation of power was often done 
through acts of aggression such as coups d’états and obvious election fraud whereas now the 
power is consolidated by a country’s leader through the manipulation of laws and institutions 
(Bermeo 2016). To better explain this, I will be referring to these differences as authoritarian 
reversion and constitutional retrogression (Huq and Ginsburg 2018). Authoritarian reversion 
is the more rapid decline of democracy through coup or state of emergency. This type of 
backsliding was typically seen during and before the Cold War and often used violence and 
intimidation either by the public, military, or the head of state in order to achieve consolidated 
power in the executive (Huq and Ginsburg 2018). Constitutional retrogression is the slow 
decay of fair elections, liberal rights, and administrative rule of law, the consolidation of power, 
and changes in social, political, and constitutional norms (Huq and Ginsberg 2018). This type of 
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backsliding leads to a change in democratic structure by a slow process of giving the executive 
more power over a longer period of time thus making it harder to identify in its initial stages 
(Huq and Ginsburg 2018, pg 92-94; McCoy et. al, 2018; Chafetz and Pozen, 2018). Other 
indicators of constitutional retrogression include the consolidation of power through amending 
the constitution, bypassing the system of checks and balances by court-packing or 
undermining/ignoring legislation, consolidating power in the executive, controlling and attacking 
press freedoms, and influencing elections (Bermeo 2016). 
Since Gibler and Randazzo’s article on independent judiciaries and democratic backsliding 
that was published in 2011, global democracy has been in an overall decline. Their sample was 
collected from 1960 to 2000, where more countries were becoming more democratic than not. 
According to Milan Svolik and further reiterated by Tom Ginsburg in “Democratic Backsliding 
and the Rule of Law” more countries are becoming less democratic than countries are actually 
becoming democratic since 2006. Prior to 2008, 61% of the democratic collapses were by a 
military coup, 30% by incumbent takeover, 7% by civil war, and 2% by revolution. Since 2008, 
incumbent takeovers have surpassed military coups (Ginsburg 2018, pg 352). Nancy Bermeo 
further echoes these sentiments by describing the overall decline from coups d’états and obvious 
election fraud during the Cold War to more subtle forms of backsliding. These “subtle” forms were 
being instigated by the very same institutions (executive and legislative/parliamentary) meant to 
uphold democracy since the end of the Cold War (Bermeo 2016). 
 Recent publications suggest that courts have been able to prevent a constitutional 
usurpation of power by the head of state and have been successful in doing so. Yet, other 
research indicates that courts have not been successful in their attempts to check the executive of 
their state when they are overstepping. As I mentioned earlier, this is the gap in recent literature 
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that needs to be addressed in order to understand how courts play a role in preventing the fall of 
democracy when faced with constitutional retrogression.  
First, I will begin by addressing an article that provides examples of courts in recent years 
that are protecting the country’s constitution and democratic values and how they are doing so. 
This will help demonstrate one side the aforementioned gap in the literature that indicates the 
success of the courts in protecting democracy after the Cold War. In this article by Tom 
Ginsburg (2018), “The Jurisprudence of Anti-Erosion,” Ginsburg highlights certain modalities of 
democratic backsliding and the court’s role in each of them. Courts are protecting the 
constitution by turning to the doctrine known as “unconstitutional constitutional amendments” 
(pg. 352) which allows judges to speak against those in power and favor the “democratic will” 
(pg. 357). More courts are showing a willingness to strike down extending term limits by citing 
that they are incompatible with democracy, all according to Ginsburg. Courts, in the cases 
discussed below, have increased their own defense mechanisms to protect their independence in 
the surge of democratic backsliding by not allowing certain members they deem to be unfit from 
being seated (pg. 352). Examples of courts in protecting the constitution were also provided by 
Ginsburg to include the removal of President Jacob Zuma by the South African Constitutional 
Court, the refusal to seat incoming members by the PiS when the Polish Prime Minister 
attempted to pack the courts in 2015, and the refusal from the Colombian Constitutional Court to 
allow President Alvaro Uribe a third term (Ginsburg 2018). This demonstrates the abilities of 
independent judiciaries to protect democratic norms and values when faced with an executive 
trying to gain power. However, there is also literature indicating that courts are not successful in 
protecting democratic norms and values after the Cold War.  
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Some academic studies note the inability of independent judiciaries to fully prevent 
constitutional change in favor of giving the executive more power. One reason for this could be 
the significance of changing constitutional norms. In one study, by McCoy et. al, of four 
constitutional democracies: Turkey, Venezuela, Hungary, and the United States, it was found 
that constitutional change was successful in three out of the four countries in order to consolidate 
power for the executive. It was not successful in the United States but it is significant that the 
USA witnessed a violation of social-political norms in order to tamper with the Supreme Court 
nomination of Former President Obama thus allowing President Trump to pick the next Supreme 
Court nomination (McCoy et. al, 2018). In fact, the degradation of social-political norms and 
constitutional norms alone may be significant enough cause for the power of the court to change 
in preventing democratic backsliding. According to Chafetz and Polen, constitutional norms 
(which are not written in the constitution but traditionally followed and accepted) are not 
necessarily destroyed but can be decomposed. Constitutional norms can be, “- dynamically 
interpreted and applied in ways that are held out as compliant but end up limiting their capacity 
to constrain the conduct of government officials,” (Chafetz and Pozen, 2018). Applying this 
interpretation of changing norms to the power that most independent judiciaries have in 
protecting their constitutional democracies, it would be reasonable that a court cannot prevent the 
change in constitutional norms if other branches chose to interpret them differently being that 
they are not concrete and written down.  
There is conflicting evidence on the effectiveness of courts in preventing backsliding this 
maybe because there are little courts can do to enforce their rulings. Recent articles that have 
focused on democratic backsliding in the European Union find that if a head-of-state is 
determined enough, there is little a court can do to prevent backsliding according to Blauberger 
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and Kelemen (2017). They further explain that even if existing safeguards in the European Union 
were updated and expanded like maximizing the infringement proceedings brought to the ECJ by 
the European Commission or private parties bringing forth litigation against national 
governments in EU courts in order to enforce and protect the rights, there would still be 
limitations to the courts’ abilities. Even if necessary updates and enforcement measures were put 
in place in the EU to prevent democratic backsliding, courts would not be fully capable of 
protecting the constitution if a head of state is determined enough leading the independence of 
these courts to be compromised (Blauberger and Kelemen 2017). This finding is supported by 
examples of two countries (Hungary and Poland) in the European Union that are experiencing 
democratic backsliding and have attempts made by the courts to protect their democracy that has 
ultimately been thwarted by what Blauberger and Kelemen would consider a determined enough 
executive. These case studies on Hungary and Poland find that their judiciaries have taken a 
considerable toll in the face of democratic backsliding, as demonstrated by in an article by 
Kovacs and Scheppele. Hungary, for example, had ratified its constitution after the 2010 election 
to essentially eliminate all checks on the executive from the other branches. Hungary also 
increased the high court’s workload and increased the number of sitting judges from 11 to 15 to 
basically neutralize any opposing views from the judges. The courts fought back until the 
executive nullified all the case laws from 1990-2011 so the court could not rely on previously 
existing decisions. Poland’s courts faced turmoil with its new government starting with allowing 
the legislature to pick new judges before courts have an open position. When the courts retaliated 
by attempting to rule the past elections unfair, President Duda refused to publish their decisions 
and swore in five new judges. The intervention of the European Commission made little to no 
difference in these cases when they tried to intervene (Kovacs and Scheppele 2018). Both 
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examples from Hungary and Poland provide evidence to support the claims made by Blauberger 
and Kelemen (2017) that there is little an independent judiciary can do to prevent democratic 
backsliding if the executive is determined enough.  
1.1.2 The Role of Courts as a Democratic Institution  
Two key elements relate back to the effectiveness of courts in protecting democratic 
values. These two key elements are independence and legitimacy. Independence and legitimacy 
were stressed by Gibler and Randazzo as two important components of effective constitutional 
courts (Gibler and Randazzo 2011). Legitimacy in high courts is established through a multitude 
of contributing factors as found by Gibson, Caldeira, and Baird (1998). According to them, 
institutional legitimacy of independent judiciaries matters because without it, “-courts find it 
difficult to serve as effective and consequential partners in governance,” (pg. 343). High courts 
gain their legitimacy through public support, in which a majority of the public is typically 
satisfied with the decisions of their high courts. These courts are often salient, and sheer 
awareness and specific support of these courts foster diffuse support (Gibson et al 1998). 
Independence in court literature is better summarized by Linzer and Staton (2012). They 
summarize the differing views of independence into two concepts: autonomy and power. 
Autonomy (pg. 225) is the ability of the judges to make decisions that are uninfluenced and 
based on their interpretation of the law. Power (pg. 225) is the ability of the judiciary and the 
judges have in constraining the decisions of other political actors (Linzer and Staton 2012).  I 
will continue to discuss the literature surrounding the importance of independence and the 
legitimacy of judiciaries when it comes to maintaining functioning democracies.  
First, I will address how independent judiciaries can serve to protect democracy through 
the process of judicial review. Daniel Sutter (1997) argues that judicial review can mitigate the 
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problems that surround enforcing constitutional constraints. These problems include identifying 
and preventing violations of the constitution, enforcing constraints, and facilitating collective 
action against those that violate the constitution (Sutter 1997). His argument provides evidence 
of the effectiveness of courts in protecting the constitution and their role as an institution in 
protecting democracy. Further research from Reenock, Staton, and Radean (2013) provide 
evidence that judicial institutions are paramount in assuring democratic survival through their 
ability to monitor and coordinate democratic compromise in stable developed countries. 
Moreover, independent judiciaries serve as a check on the other branches of government. The 
ability to exercise checks and balances among political elites and government branches is 
essential to democracy because it enforces constitutional constraints and keeps one branch from 
abusing its powers (Holcombe 2018). Courts as an institution serve as an integral part of this 
system of checks and balances which facilitates the democratic process. These examples provide 
evidence to support the importance of independent judiciaries in protecting democratic norms 
and values in developed countries. While it is important to understand how independent 
judiciaries protect democracy, for the purpose of this study, it is also important to address how 
the loss of their independence can negatively impact their ability to protect democracy.  
Independence allows courts to exercise checks and balances without interference from 
the other branches. The system of separation of powers and maintaining checks and balances 
help constrain the power of the elites, as Michael Touchton found when studying the stability of 
democracies in Latin American countries. Maintaining checks and balances between branches 
further helps stabilize democratic values and norms (Touchton 2016). However, the system of 
upholding the separation of powers can be compromised upon political attacks on the judiciaries. 
Courts are vital at the beginning of a populist regime because they can help protect democratic 
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values. These values and norms are often subject to attack under a populist regime because 
populists, unlike a democratic regime, often seek to dismantle the system that got them elected in 
order to stay in power (Prendergast 2019). Political attacks on the judiciary weaken their 
independence because they weaken the legitimacy of the courts to the public. The legitimacy of 
courts is weakened when the public starts to lack confidence in courts after there have been 
attacks by a political candidate or leader (Bright 1997). The American Bar Association published 
an article stressing how political attacks on the courts negatively impact the legitimacy of the 
courts which then can threaten judicial independence then leads to a threatened system of the 
separation of powers between branches (Keeva 1997). After extensive research, I argue that 
attacking the judicial branch of a government would hinder the abilities of the courts from 
protecting democratic constitutional norms and values because their legitimacy would be 
compromised in the public’s opinion which then threatens their independence. Attacking courts 
weakens their independence thus making it more difficult for them to protect the constitution in 
times of political turmoil or in a populist regime as mentioned above. For this reason, in my 
thesis, I will seek to understand how political attacks on the judiciary affect democratic erosion. I 
predict that an increase in attacks on the independent judiciaries from the executive or other 
branches will lead to democratic erosion. If there is evidence to support my theory, we will 
observe more government and political attacks on the courts after the year 2000 than before it. 
Furthermore, if my theory has significant evidence, we will also observe a difference in the 
effect that court attacks have on the democratic scores of a country before and after the year 
2000 than before it.  
To summarize, Gibler and Randazzo found independent judiciaries to be effective in 
preventing democratic backsliding using a sample from 1960-2000. As I have discussed, there 
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was less democratic backsliding occurring at the time and a majority of it was through 
authoritarian reversion. Democratic backsliding has evolved to constitutional retrogression 
meaning physical acts of aggression from an authoritarian regime like coups are less prevalent 
while political attacks and the degradation of institutions have become more prevalent. This 
paper serves to address how effective the courts are in protecting democratic values and norms 
since the year 2000 in the face of political attacks. 
 
1.2 Expected Results  
Do political attacks on independent judiciaries weaken courts’ abilities to protect 
democratic values and norms? Gibler and Randazzo’s (2011) research finds evidence to support 
the overall effectiveness of independent judiciaries in protecting constitutional democracies from 
reversion. Despite their findings, there is not enough evidence to support that this would still 
hold true if tested on a more recent sample set and with some adjustments in order to fine tune 
the study.  
The key differences from their sample set and one that were to start in 2000 is the obvious 
change in style of democratic backsliding as previously discussed. Elected officials are 
seemingly no longer resorting to coups to thwart their adversaries, thus indicating their 
manipulation of democratic norms. This is hard to identify in the beginning of a regime change 
because democratic norms largely involve compromise. Independent judiciaries, much like other 
branches, will have slower reactions to usurpation of power during constitutional retrogression 
due to its subtly and slow-moving process, as I have also previously discussed.  
During times of constitutional retrogression, the degradation political norms is crucial to 
the next step, the weakening of democratic institutions. Since the use-of-force is rarely being 
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seen during democratic transitions in the 2000s, it has become quite imperative that degrading 
political norms is often used as a tactic to allow the head-of-state to then weaken the other 
democratic institutions in order to usurp more power for their self. This moves in a sort of linear 
progression of events, often very slow at first and difficult to recognize.  
How does all of this apply to independent judiciaries? They are a democratic institution 
that heavily rely on independence and legitimacy in order to function properly in a constitutional 
democracy. Attacking their legitimacy and independence can effectively be done by disregarding 
political norms. This includes tactics such as court packing, public political attacks on the 
judiciary, judicial reform, and lack of compliance with court rulings. These tactics go against 
established political norms thus leading to weakening the institution of the courts as a democratic 
safeguard. Weakening a democratic institution will ultimately lead to a loss in democracy as the 
head of state usurps more power.  
  Independent judiciaries are vital institutions in protecting democratic values and norms 
in democratic countries. However, courts’ legitimacy and independence can be threatened upon 
political attacks; these attacks will result in the weakening of courts as an institution thus 
resulting in a greater loss in democratic values. 
Hypothesis  
 H1: An increase in attacks on independent judiciaries from the head of state or other 
branches of government will result in lower democratic scores.  
 H2: Attacks on the judiciary are more prevalent in a time of constitutional retrogression 
than in a time of authoritarian reversion. 
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I expect to find that political attacks weaken the institution of independent courts thus leading to 
a decrease in the empirical value of judicial independence, this will then lead to a decrease in 
democratic values.  
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2 EMPIRICAL DESIGN 
In order to study if an increase in attacks on independent judiciaries will result in a 
decrease in democracy scores, I will be conducting a multivariate OLS regression and a cross 
tabular analysis from 1980 to 2015 on all the high-ranking democratic countries. Before I move 
forward, I will explain two important aspects to the entirety of my design. One aspect is the time 
frame that I am testing my data in. The other is the type of democracies that I am observing. 
I am observing my data from 1980 to 2015 for a few reasons. I am seeking to draw a 
comparison between democratic backsliding in the Cold War and democratic backsliding after 
the Cold War. As I have previously discussed, democratic backsliding in the Cold War often 
used more aggressive measures which is why Huq and Ginsburg (2018) refer to it as 
authoritarian reversion. Whereas democratic backsliding after the Cold War (also known as 
constitutional retrogression) does not use these same aggressive measures (Huq and Ginsburg 
2018). For the sake of this study, it is important to include observations ranging from a part of 
the Cold War era (the 1980s) and observations after the Cold War (the 2000s). This way I can 
account for both authoritarian reversion and constitutional retrogression.  
Furthermore, I am only observing democratic countries. I will be excluding anything that is 
coded as a hybrid regime, autocratic state, or failed democracy. This study is mostly concerned 
with the preliminary symptoms and warning signs of democratic backsliding. This implies that a 
country must be a complete democracy or coded as a high-level democracy in order for it to start 
exhibiting signs of backsliding. Once a country is no longer coded as a democracy, it can be 
presumed that it has already been experiencing symptoms related to backsliding for a while. I am 
seeking to understand the initial decline not the continued decent into autocracy.  
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2.1 Tests 
2.1.1 Data Sources 
I will be collecting my data from a variety of sources. Primarily, I will be using V-Dem’s 
2019 data set and the Latent Judicial Independence scores (LJI) from Linzer and Staton (2015). 
For my dependent variable, I will use the Polity “Institutionalized democracy” score provided by 
V-Dem to measure the democracy scores of my observed countries from 1980 to 2015. Polity 
considers democratic regimes to be scored from 6 points to 10 points on their democratic scale, 
so I will only be observing countries from 1980 to 2015 that are assigned a 6 or higher. I will use 
the Polity scores for two reasons: Gibler and Randazzo used Polity scores to assess democratic 
scores, and I am trying to keep my study similar to theirs since their paper on the court’s role in 
democratic survival largely inspired the topic of this paper, and I am expanding upon the 
foundation of their paper. Also, Polity measures democracy in three ways that are favorable to 
this study. The three ways they assess democracy are,  
“Democracy is conceived as three essential, interdependent elements. One is the 
presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective 
preferences about alternative policies and leaders. Second is the existence of 
institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive. The third is the 
guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political 
participation (pg. 319),” (Coppedge et. al 2019).  
The second element of how Polity assesses democracy is crucial to this study since I am looking 
at the effectiveness of the courts on checking the powers of the executive.   
To understand how independent courts protect democracy, I will be using the Latent 
Judicial Independence (LJI) scores for my high court independence measurements due to its 
widely accepted accuracy in measuring judicial independence since its publication in 2012. It has 
since been updated to encompass judicial independence scores for countries up to 2015. This is 
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primarily why my observations end in 2015 instead of 2018 or 2019. I decided not to use the 
high court independence score provided by V-Dem upon the recommendation of Dr. Staton, who 
clarified that it does not follow the LJI formula of measurement (Linzer and Staton 2012; 2015). 
My variables accounting for political attacks on the judiciary will include the following 
from V-Dem: “court-packing,” “government attacks on judiciary,” “judicial reform,” and 
“compliance with high court” to measure the effect of the attacks on the courts and on 
democratic erosion. These variables were chosen specifically for this study since there have been 
reported cases of each one in countries that are possibly experiencing backsliding as I previously 
discussed in this paper. “Court-packing” is assessed by V-Dem as how many judges are added to 
the judiciary and whether it was for political reasons. “Government attacks on judiciary” 
measures the frequency of government attacks on the integrity of the courts. “Judicial reform” 
measures if the judiciary’s powers were changed by an institution in a way that alters their 
abilities to exercise their formal powers or access to the judiciary. “Compliance with high court” 
measures how often the government complies with important high court decisions (Coppedge et. 
al 2019).  
To account for any possible other influences that might lead to democratic backsliding, I 
will be including the following control variables: gross nation income (GNI), recession or 
economic collapse, and armed conflict. Including GNI as a measurement of wealth is important 
due to the collective findings that show that wealthy countries are less likely to see democratic 
deterioration (Gibler and Randazzo 2012; Lipset 1959, 75; Przeworski et al. 2000). I will be 
integrating my data for this variable from the World Bank’s database which tracks every 
country’s GNI per year (World Bank, 2020). I will be considering a variable for economic 
breakdowns and recessions. It is believed that situations of economic recessions tend to be 
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followed by a series of democratic backsliding (Gibler and Randazzo 2012). This will be 
measured by a decrease in the country’s GDP growth per year. I will only be including countries 
that are experiencing a decline in GDP (or negative growth) of 3% or more in one year. For this, 
I will be using the World Bank database as well (World Bank 2020). I will also be including two 
variables that encompass militaristic threats because situations of militaristic threats have been 
found to contribute to a usurpation of power by the executive in order to address militaristic 
threats (Rasler 1986; Mansfield and Snyder 2003; Gibler and Randazzo 2012). I will be using V-
Dem’s variables for international and internal armed conflicts to assess whether or not the 
countries participated in or experienced armed conflicts that would then make them more 
susceptible to democratic erosion (Coppedge et. al 2019).  
2.1.2 Testing the Data 
To understand how attacks on the judiciary are more prevalent in a time of constitutional 
retrogression than in a time of authoritarian reversion, I will be performing a cross-tabular 
analysis. I will be examining the attacks on the judiciary using the variables listed above for 
independent judiciary from before and after the year 2000. I will be analyzing this by democracy 
scores. This will help me assess the amount of attacks on the courts before and after 2000 and to 
identify if the amount of attacks has increased or decreased since 2000. This is important to my 
study because evidence shows that the style in which democracies backslide has since changed 
from acts of aggression (authoritarian reversion) to the systematic dismantling of democratic 
norms and values (constitutional retrogression). The change from authoritarian reversion to 
constitutional retrogression occurred after the end of the Cold War and was most notably 
different by 2000 which is why the observations will be separated at 2000 instead of another year 
(Huq and Ginsburg 2018). It will also help me identify if the attacks on the courts affect the 
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democracy scores in the democratic countries being observed. My cross-tab analysis will look 
like the following for example, “For countries with a democracy score of 8, there were X number 
of attacks in the years up to 2000 and Y number of attacks on the courts after the year 2000. For 
countries with a democracy score of 7, there were X number of attacks before the year 2000 and 
Y number of attacks after the year 2000.” From there, I can identify how the number of attacks 
on the judiciary correlates to the democracy scores in the democratic countries pre and post 
2000. I expect to see more attacks in countries after 2000 than before 2000.  
In order to test whether government attacks on the judiciary contribute to weakened 
judicial independence thus leading to a decrease in democracy score, I will be performing an 
OLS regression while lagging my dependent variable behind two years to see if the applied 
effect actually resulted in a change of democracy score. I will be measuring how attacks on the 
courts affect democracy scores pre and post 2000. I will be doing so in order to examine the 
difference in the effect that the court attacks have on judicial independence and the possible 
change of democracy scores. I expect that there will be a greater number of attacks on the courts 
in the post-2000 sample and that the attacks will have a greater effect on the change of 
democracy scores. I anticipate this, again, because we are witnessing constitutional retrogression 
instead of authoritarian reversion after the year 2000. I do not anticipate that there will be a 
significant correlation between attacks on the judiciary and democratic scores in the pre-2000 
sample because the type of democratic backsliding during this time period typically involves acts 
of aggression.  
In my regression, I will include the following independent variables in order to 
understand how they affect my regression. The independent variables that I will be including are 
variables that have long been understood to affect the survival of democracy. These variables can 
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influence the fluctuation of democracy scores. First, for judicial independence, I will be using the 
Linzer-Staton measurement for judicial independence because it provides the most complete 
measurement of independence (Linzer and Staton 2012; 2015). I will also lag the independent 
judiciary score, but by one year instead of two. This will make sure the effect of the political 
attacks on the judiciaries is accounted for before running the regression. Next, I will include my 
variables for government attacks on courts followed by my control variables.  
When I run my regression I expect to find that countries with greater attacks on their 
judiciaries will have lower democracy scores than countries with little to no attacks on their 
judiciaries. I expect to see these findings because there is strong evidence to support that 
independent judiciaries help prevent democratic backsliding but can be subject to attacks from 
the government, thus weakening their independence and their ability to prevent erosion. This 
study has its limitations, however. Attacking democratic institutions is not the only symptom of 
democratic backsliding. Often, degrading social norms, restricting civil rights in minority groups, 
and tampering with the freedom of the press are a few examples of other occurrences witnessed 
during democratic backsliding. Attacking independent judiciaries may exacerbate the erosion of 
democracy but it certainly is not the only cause, and democracies can certainly decay even 
without attacking courts. This study just serves to identify the relationship between attacks on the 
courts and democratic erosion.  
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3 RESULTS 
The results of the tests prove to be promising, however there are significant limitations and 
points of departure that need to be discussed. These aforementioned points mostly revolve 
around the sources that I compiled my data from, and my own error in data collection, testing, 
and interpretation. I will explain more in my findings sections.  
3.1 Findings 
3.1.1 Fitting the Data 
Along with discussing my results, I will discuss the number of regressions performed on 
my data and why, any other tests that I may have performed in the interim, the variables and 
observations that were excluded and why, and any other necessary information that pertains to 
the results of this study. Before I discuss my results, I will detail the data compilation process in 
order to make clear what is missing from my dataset.  
After compiling my data and entering it into the same spreadsheet, the first thing I was 
tasked with was filling in or removing blank observations from my dataset. Most of the blank 
observations were for my recession variable and my GNI variable. My recession variable 
consisted of every country’s GDP and I had obtained the data from the World Bank database. I 
had planned to only include observations that displayed a loss of GDP that was 3% or greater 
each year. However, this meant I would likely have to exclude all other observations that were 
greater than -2.9%, which would result in much of that variable consisting of blank observations. 
Due to my inexperience and the programs that I was running, I could not run a regression with a 
variable that contains blank observations. I turned the GDP variable into a dummy GDP variable. 
In this study, a country that did not experience a recession resulting in a loss of 3% of more of 
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their GDP in a year received a ‘0’ for no recession. All countries that experienced a loss of 3% or 
greater of their GDP in a year were coded ‘1’ for yes.  
There were fewer blank or missing inputs for a country’s GNI, so I resulted to removing 
the entire observation (country, year, dependent variable, independent variables and constants) 
for that missing observation. This was also due in part to not necessarily having the full skill set 
to run the regressions with missing variables. An estimated total of 10 to 20 single observations 
were removed due to missing GNI inputs, and one entire country was also removed. It occurred 
to me during this process that the World Bank does not publish any data or acknowledge the 
existence of Taiwan (it does however recognize and provide separate datasets for Hong Kong as 
a separate entity from China). All other sources had data on Taiwan except the World Bank, so I 
did not have a GDP or GNI to list for it. Removing Taiwan removed roughly 20 observations 
from my dataset. This does not appear to affect my data because there was little no fluctuation 
with Taiwan’s democracy score or independent court score. Also, my complete dataset contains 
2700 observations after removing any with missing inputs, so due to the large scale of my study, 
I did not see that removing some observations would result in significant change in my analysis.   
Furthermore, the two variables for armed conflict (internal and international) provided by 
V-Dem were not complete. To resolve this, I referenced the codebook provided by V-Dem to 
discover that countries that received a ‘0’ for “no conflict” could also receive a ‘0’ for “no 
known conflict”. All countries with a missing input for those two variables are now coded ‘0’ for 
“no conflict” or “no known conflict”.  
Lastly, before I ran any tests on my data, I did have to fit the remaining democracy scores 
to the remaining court independence scores that did not initially “match” when I merged 
datasets. The two that I merged were the Polity democracy scores provided by V-Dem and the 
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high court independence scores by Linzer and Staton. Some countries did not match in the initial 
merge due to different country names. Some countries being observed underwent name changes, 
like Macedonia and North Macedonia, after the data had already been collected, while other 
countries were referred to under their common name instead of their internationally recognized 
name such as, The Congo instead of the Republic of Congo. I resolved this by manually merging 
the remaining observations into my dataset.  
3.1.2 Initial Regression Analysis 
My regression analysis rejects my null hypothesis and provide evidence in the contrary. 
This is demonstrated in Table 1. There is a positive, significant relationship between democracy 
scores and judicial independence scores in all three models. This means that if high court 
independence scores were to decrease, we would expect a decrease in democracy in a country’s 
democracy score as well. Across both models, court packing holds a significant and positive 
influence on democracy scores (I ran Model (3) without government attacks on the high courts to 
test for interference, more on this later). This supports my theory. This shows that if governments 
either do not pack their courts or pack their courts when it is not politically motivated but needed 
to improve judicial functions, democracy scores are expected to increase. This provides evidence 
to support my theory because court packing is measured 0-3, with 0 meaning there was often 
strong, politically motivated incidences of court packing and 3 meaning there were either no 
cases of court packing or positive/needed cases of court packing (not politically motivated).  
 While court-packing provides evidence to support my theory, compliance with the high 
court holds a negative and significant impact on democracy scores. This would technically 
indicate that as governments become less compliant with the high court, democracy scores would 
increase. This does not support my theory; however, I am not throwing it out entirely, yet. This is 
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difficult to interpret. There is a chance that in the beginning stages of democratic backsliding, a 
government will not be compliant with a high court’s ruling until after more drastic measures 
have been taken like court packing. Once the head of state has packed the court with judges that 
will support their agenda, it could be more likely that the head of state becomes compliant with 
the courts’ rulings again. In the same respect, after a court has been packed, the 
legislative/parliamentarian branch could shift their compliance with the courts’ rulings as well. 
This relationship is not linear and would need further investigation.  
 International arms conflict holds a negative, significant relationship to democracy scores 
while internal arms conflict is positive and significant. The variable for recession is not 
significant and GNI is significant at 0 for all three models. All three of these variables are 
important to this study, but in future tests they should be adjusted and possibly sourced from 
different places. GNI was too large of a number to run in my regression and could possibly be 
affecting my results. The armed conflict variables should be included but were not as detailed 
and thorough as I would have liked.  
 I ran three regressions to understand if there was any interference between two of my 
independent variables, government attacks and court packing. I was testing to see if these 
variables were interfering with each other based off the notion that a politician who is trying 
change a court by packing it would also be verbally attacking in the public eye to justify the 
court packing. Upon removing court packing from Model 2 in Table 1, the significance of 
government attacks on the courts did not change and the coefficient slightly increased. After 
removing government attacks from Model 3 in Table 1, the coefficient for court packing barely 
changed yet remained significant.  
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Table 1 
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3.2 Limitations 
Before I provide an explanation for my cross tabular analysis, I will discuss that I had an 
exceedingly difficult time collecting and interpreting the data set that I was sent and downloaded 
from V-Dem. Therefore, this paper has been edited to include the following from myself,  
 
“I was under the impression that my four “political attacks on courts” variables 
were coded improperly and did not match the codebook. I had downloaded the wrong 
dataset for my variables. The information is still correct, but I downloaded a weighted 
distribution of my dataset instead of the raw dataset. We (myself and my committee) did 
not discover this until I was quite literally defending this thesis. There was no time 
available to me to rectify the situation as finding the raw, unweighted data, fitting it to my 
study and running it again would be too time consuming. The following is how I 
proceeded about fitting the dataset that I had received to the codebook so I could interpret 
it according to the codebook. After further discussion with my thesis committee, it 
appears that this was the best process to take considering I was under the impression that 
the data was coded improperly. The steps that I did take did not significantly change the 
results of the original dataset so my interpretation at the end should still stand as correct.” 
 
 
The dataset that I received does not match the accompanying codebook. This is how I 
will adjust it so that it does fit the codebook. For example, the variable representing government 
compliance with the high court is listed as an ordinal variable that was then changed to an 
interval variable and assigned the values 0 through 4. 0 represents the least amount of 
compliance from the government with the high court’s ruling while 4 would represent the most 
compliance. When cross-referencing my data set, I discovered that this variable now had integers 
ranging from -1.78 to 2.86 instead. This discrepancy was true for all four variables. Each 
variable had differing inputs that did not match their expected codes.  
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Court_P Stuff Gov_Att Stuff Jud_Ref Stuff Comp_HC Stuff 
Coded: 0-3  Coded: 0-4  Coded: 0-2  Coded: 0-4  
        
Mean 0.459 Mean 0.517 Mean 0.491 Mean 1.295 
Median 0.757 Median 0.797 Median 0.493 Median 1.3745 
Mode 1.458 Mode 1.572 Mode 0.57 Mode 1.601 
Range 5.341 Range 7.052 Range 6.703 Range 4.641 
Minimum -3.676 Minimum -4.432 Minimum -3.232 Minimum -1.783 
Maximum 1.665 Maximum 2.62 Maximum 3.471 Maximum 2.858 
Count 2700 Count 2700 Count 2700 Count 2700 
Table 2 
 
Table 2 consists of the summary statistics for each political attack variable. In the table I 
included what each variable was coded as according to the codebook (‘0-2’, ‘0-3’, ‘0-4’). The 
minimum and maximum values represent what the data appears as in the provided dataset (these 
are the weighted scores that I received I did not know I received). So, I attempted to remedy this 
by redownloading the dataset that I was sent by V-Dem. I then identified that the input values for 
the variables did not change while merging datasets and uploading them into any of my software 
programs. Next, I consulted the “Methods” handbook also provided by V-Dem, yet I could not 
seem to locate an answer as to why the data appeared different on the provided spreadsheets 
versus in the codebook (Coppedge et. al 2020). Lastly, I referenced the working paper on their 
website, which was cited in the codebook, to identify if this would reveal any explanation 
(Pemstein et. al 2018). Unfortunately, I could not find a reason or formula to explain these 
differences (at the time). Due to time restraints, I had to proceed forward with my best 
interpretation of the given data.  
 To proceed forward with my test and complete the cross tabular analysis, I skewed the 
four political attack variables so that the minimum integer would now equal 0. I did this by 
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adding the absolute value of the minimum number for each variable to every single observation 
in each variable. This brought all the minimum values to 0 and created new maximum values. I 
did this so I could better understand the distribution of the given data for the four variables. Until 
this point, I was unsure if the variables followed the codebook. I am working off of the 
assumption that the data in the spreadsheet provided was entered in the same linear pattern as the 
codebook would suggest that it was. Meaning, I am assuming that the lowest value entered in the 
spreadsheet would have also been the lowest value to be entered in that place but with the proper 
code from the codebook. 
Court_P Column1 Gov_Att Column2 Jud_Ref Column3 Comp_HC Column4 
        
Mean 4.135 Mean 4.949 Mean 3.723 Mean 3.078 
Median 4.433 Median 5.229 Median 3.725 Median 3.1575 
Mode 5.134 Mode 6.004 Mode 3.802 Mode 3.384 
Range 5.341 Range 7.052 Range 6.703 Range 4.641 
Minimum 0 Minimum 0 Minimum 0 Minimum 0 
Maximum 5.341 Maximum 7.052 Maximum 6.703 Maximum 4.641 
Count 2700 Count 2700 Count 2700 Count 2700 
Table 3 
 
I am assuming that 0 implies greater amounts of political attacks and the maximum number for 
the variable would still mean no political attacks or positive change. I attempt to verify this 
assumption by identifying which country, at what time had the highest assigned value after I 
adjusted the data. Three out of the four variables had corresponding country democracy scores 
and judicial independence scores to confirm that the highest number still implied the most 
positive outcome. For example, after adjusting the variables, I reordered “Court Packing” from 
highest (5.341) to lowest (0) and then identified which countries, years, democracy scores, and 
independent judiciary scores corresponded with a court-packing score of 5.341. The United 
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States was the country to hold a 5.341 for court-packing. This would appear to be the correct 
assignment for this value, being that the United States has not added a seat to the Supreme Court 
since 1869 and certainly has not had incidents of court-packing (Bomboy 2019). I then continued 
to observe the following countries on the spreadsheet to assure that the outcome appeared to fit 
to scale. The only variable that did not seem to fit the adjusted scale was “Judicial Reform.” The 
highest value of 6.703 was assigned to Colombia for one year only. It was sporadically placed 
with countries that had medium to low democracy scores and judicial independence scores after. 
However, this does not exclude this variable from the study. “Judicial Reform” is coded as 0-2, 
with 0 indicating that the judiciary’s arbitrary powers were negatively impacted or reduced by 
institutional change, 1 meaning there was no change, and 2 meaning there was positive change to 
enhance their powers. A country does not need to specifically adopt institutional change 
consistently from year to year, similar to how they do not need to consistently pass the same law 
every year for it to be implemented. After creating new scales for these variables and confirming 
that they were properly assigned to the country and year that best suited their value, I feel 
confident enough to follow through with my cross-tabular analysis. 
 To run my cross-tabular analysis, I divided up my range of numbers in the scales that I 
have adjusted for by the range of numbers that were provided by the codebook so I could fit it to 
the scale provide by V-Dem. For example, if one variable was originally coded to be 0-3, but it 
appeared in the data as -3 through 3, I would adjust it by adding the absolute value of the 
minimum number to all the observations. This would provide me with a variable that has integers 
ranging from 0-6 instead. I would then check to make sure that the highest value (6, in this case) 
was assigned with a country that had some of the highest democracy scores and judicial 
independence scores. After this, I divided my scale (0-6) into 3 parts because the V-Dem 
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codebook indicated that that variable ranged from 0-3, with each number representing a different 
level of the amount of court attacks. Now what the codebook says is coded as a 0-1, in my 
dataset will be all observations less than or equal to 2 (ranging 0-2). What the codebook has 
coded as 1-2, will be between a 2-4 according to my adjusted scale. Lastly, if the codebook has it 
coded as 2-3, my adjusted scale will account for it being 4-6. This is all the make sure the large 
values remain large, the small values stay small, and all are assigned to their original meaning in 
the codebook.  
3.3 Cross Tabular Analysis  
The results of the cross tabular analysis provide evidence to support my theory. As I 
predicted, more political attacks are being observed after 2000 than before 2000. These political 
attacks do not represent the actual number of attacks on the high courts since each variable was 
an ordinal variable, converted into an interval variable. These values do indicate that more 
attacks in general are being observed. Before I continue my observation, I will provide a 
description of how each variable was coded in the V-Dem codebook and how I subsequently 
chose which value to consider as an attack on the courts and which values were not considered.  
Court Packing  
V-Dem Code: 0-3 
Adjusted Code: 0-5.34 
-I assessed that attacks 
stopped with accounts 
greater than 2 (3.56 
adjusted) based the 
description provided by V-
Dem. 
“0: There was a massive, politically motivated increase in the 
number of judgeships across the entire judiciary. 
1: There was a limited, politically motivated increase in the 
number of judgeships on very important courts. 
2: There was a limited, politically motivated increase in the 
number of judgeships. 
3: Judgeships were added to the judiciary, but there is no 
evidence that the increase was politically motivated; or there 
was no increase.” 
(pg. 155) 
Government Attacks 
V-Dem Code: 0-4 
Adjusted Code: 0-7.052 
-I assessed that attacks 
stopped with accounts 
greater than 3 (5.289 
“0: Attacks were carried out on a daily or weekly basis.  
1: Attacks were common and carried out in nearly every month 
of the year.  
2: Attacks occurred more than once. 
3: There were attacks, but they were rare.  
4: There were no attacks on the judiciary’s integrity.” 
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adjusted) based the 
description provided by V-
Dem. 
 
 
(pg. 154-155) 
Judicial Reform 
V-Dem Code: 0-2 
Adjusted Code: 0-6.703 
-I assessed that attacks 
stopped with accounts 
greater than 1 (3.352 
adjusted) based the 
description provided by V-
Dem. 
“0: The judiciary’s ability to control arbitrary power was 
reduced via institutional reform. 
1: There was no change to the judiciary’s ability to control 
arbitrary power via institutional review. 
2: The judiciary’s ability to control arbitrary power was 
enhanced via institutional reform.” 
 
 
(pg. 153-154) 
Compliance with the HC 
V-Dem Code: 0-4 
Adjusted Code: 0-4.61 
-I assessed that attacks 
stopped with accounts 
greater than 2 (2.23 
adjusted) based the 
description provided by V-
Dem. 
“0: Never.  
1: Seldom. 
2: About half of the time.  
3: Usually.  
4: Always.” 
 
 
(pg. 158-159) 
Table 4            (Coppedge et. al 2019) 
  
 Now that I have provided the descriptions for each variable and how I determined which 
value was observed, I will continue with my results. I predicted that there would be greater  
Table 5 
political attacks on the independent judiciaries 
after 2000 because of Huq and Ginsburg’s (2018) 
findings that democratic backsliding has changed 
from authoritarian reversion to constitutional 
retrogression after the Cold War ended and 
noticeably by the beginning of the  
2000s. Alarmingly, there is a five-year difference between the two columns, with 1980-1999 
having almost 20 years’ worth of data while 2000-2015 has only 15 years’ worth. This means 
Democracy Scores 1980-1999 2000-2015 
10 598 590 
9 271 425 
8 285 495 
7 292 417 
6 344 382 
Total  1790 2309 
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that even with 5 fewer years, the post-Cold War dataset saw more attacks on judiciaries than the 
late-Cold War dataset. This could indicate a greater rise in the types of mechanisms that the 
political leaders and institutions are willing to utilize to usurp power. Also, in this table, it had 
remained consistent that there are a large number of observations in for countries with a 
democracy score of 10. Between 1980 and 1999, roughly 33.4% of the political attacks reported 
happened in level 10 democracies. In the following years, this proportion decreases to 25.5%. 
Despite the decrease over time, this is still a lot more than I predicted.  
Furthermore, of these variables, “Compliance with the High Court” contributed a great deal 
more to these findings than the other variables. As detailed above, there is a good chance that it 
needs further investigation on how it affects democracy scores on its own. There is a chance that 
it is a useful mechanism for political figures to manipulate when trying to gain more power. High 
courts do not have an enforcement mechanism, so they cannot simply execute their rulings like 
other branches may be able to. Non-compliance does not involve disrupting the status quo like 
government attacks, judicial reform, or court packing. In fact, it requires maintaining the status 
quo.  
3.4 Final Interpretation  
There is evidence to support my theory in regression analysis that democracy scores and 
independent judiciary scores maintain a positive and significant relationship. There is also 
significant evidence to support my theory that greater incidences of politically motivated court 
packing do decrease democracy scores. Further investigation into the relationship with 
democracy scores and compliance with the high court are needed. 
 I did identify that there were more political attacks on independent judiciaries after 2000 
than before 2000. This supports my theory and much of the existing literature on the current 
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change in democratic backsliding from the use of aggressive measures and use of force to the 
degradation political norms and passing of laws to usurp more power.  
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4 CONCLUSIONS 
Previous literature highlights that in the times of constitutional retrogression, the 
degradation political norms is the crucial to the next step to the weakening of democratic 
institutions. This study finds that there has been an increase in the utilization of practices 
revolving the degradation of norms, particularly pointed at the courts, to weaken them. 
These are democratic institutions that heavily rely on independence and legitimacy to 
function properly in a constitutional democracy. Attacking their legitimacy and independence 
could effectively be done by disregarding political norms. This includes tactics such as court 
packing, public political attacks on the judiciary, judicial reform, and noncompliance with court 
rulings. This study did evidence support my theory and hypothesis that political attacks on the 
courts lead to weakening their independence scores thus leading to the weakening of democracy 
scores.  
 This study found evidence to support that attacking the courts as an institution is 
becoming more prevalent in democratic countries after the Cold War. This is important both to 
the study of courts and to the study of democratic survival because we need to understand how 
and in which ways political leaders and other institutions are seeking to weaken the safeguard to 
democracy. I would suggest further research, with a better understanding of how the variables 
are coded and weighted, a multinomial logit model instead of a regression because of how small 
the range is for the dependent variable, performing a survival model to develop a timeline for 
countries starting to experience attacks, and a more detailed investigation into what kind of 
political attacks are accounting for the numbers of attacks on the courts.   
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